The Hacker Chronicles - A…the Computer Underground/The Hacker Chronicles - A Tour of the Computer Underground (P-80 Systems).iso/cud2/cud218b.txt

Text File | 1992-09-26 | 10KB | 197 lines

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                  >C O M P U T E R   U N D E R G R O U N D<
                                >D I G E S T<
              ***  Volume 2, Issue #2.18 (December 28, 1990)   **
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MODERATORS:   Jim Thomas / Gordon Meyer  ([e-mail])
ARCHIVISTS:   Bob Krause / Alex Smith
PERIPATETIC GADFLY:  Brendan Kehoe

USENET readers can currently receive CuD as alt.society.cu-digest.

COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
diverse views.  CuD material may be reprinted as long as the source is
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authors should be contacted for reprint permission.
It is assumed that non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted
unless otherwise specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned
articles relating to the Computer Underground.
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent the
            views of the moderators. Contributors assume all responsibility
            for assuring that articles submitted do not violate copyright
            protections.
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CONTENTS:
File 1: Moderators' Corner
File 2: From the Mailbag
File 3: Computers Under Attack
File 4: CU Resources in Germany
File 5: Trade Secrets; When are they Bad?

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From: Various
Subject: From the Mailbag
Date: December 28, 1990

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***  CuD #2.18: File 2 of 5: From the Mailbag                    ***
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From: Carrier Wave <[e-mail]>
Subject: Operation Sun Devil and Ayn Rand
To: [e-mail]
Date: Fri, 21 Dec 90 09:15 EST

                           Operation Sun Devil and
              Ayn Rand's Theory of "The Sanction of the Victim"
                 by Michael E. Marotta, [e-mail]

Arthur Koestler's novel, Darkness at Noon, tells of the downfall of a
Bolshevik.  He is purged by the party, charged with conspiring to
assassinate Stalin.  Of course, he did no such thing, but he soon comes
to understand the needs of his captors.  As a Bolshevik, he knows the
theory of the centralized democracy and he comes to understand that
merely questioning authority is no different than a physical assault on
the Leader.  The operant theory in this true-to-life example was later
enunciated by Ayn Rand in her novel, Atlas Shrugged.  She called it
"The Sanction of the Victim."

In Atlas Shrugged, the heroes are engineers and investors who learn to
reject mysticism, altruism and collectivism.  They learn to be proud of
their own achievements.  They identify and reconcile the contradictions
that tore them apart and allowed them to be regulated, ruled, taxed and
vilified.  One of the highlights of this novel is the trial of Hank
Rearden, a steel industrialist who violated an equalization of opportunity
law.  He tells the court that it can sentence him to anything and he is
powerless to prevent that but he will not help them by participating.  He
does not recognize their right to try him and he will not help them pretend
that the trial is just.  He is acquitted.

If this seems too unreal, consider the case of Craig Neidorf in Chicago and
compare it to the trials of the Legion of Doom in Atlanta.  Neidorf stood
his ground, prepared a First Amendment defense and asked for help from the
pioneers on the electronic frontier.  The government dropped its charges.
In Atlanta, the hackers co-operated with the government, informed on each
other and even testified against Craig Neidorf and they were sentenced to
prison.  Neidorf incurred legal expenses near $250,000.  This is also about
the size of the fines to be paid by each of the LoD hackers in Atlanta.
The difference, of course, is that Neidorf is free and they are in jail.

The decision to go to trial rested on the premise that Right makes Might.
Niedorf prepared a First Amendment argument.  In point of fact, victory
hinged on the demolition of the government's evidence.  A suitable defense
could have been created from any perspective.  The First Amendment is a
broad shield that protects religion, speech and assembly in addition to
writing.  The Tenth Amendment guarantees all those necessary and proper
rights enjoyed by the people that are not specifically enumerated in the
Bill of Rights.  Niedorf could have claimed that he was performing a
challenge commanded of him by the Gods of Olympus.  What counted most is
that he felt that his accusers were morally wrong.

The Legion of Doom went down the drain in Atlanta because they granted the
moral high ground to the government.  They were wrong in their own eyes and
they deserved punishment by their own standards.  Their viewpoint and their
standards were the same as the government's.

The question then becomes: Is hacking right?  Unless you want to go to
jail, you better find a lot of reasons to believe that it is.

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From: [e-mail]
Subject: Re: "strangers probing for security flaws" -- another view
Date: Fri, 21 Dec 90 13:11:14 -0800

Given the existing state of computer security (i.e. it requires excessive
care by a system administrator to make a system more than nominally
secure), I think that whatever automation we can bring to bear on security
testing is welcome.

Suppose there was a free program, available in source code and scrutinized
by wizards all over the net, that you could run to test your security.  If
you had the time, you might run it and fix up the things it found.  If you
didn't have the time, those things would probably go unfixed.

If someone at a remote site (Italy?) volunteers to run such a program and
mail you the results as they pertain to your site, are they performing you
a service or a disservice?  I don't know about you, but when a stranger
knocks at my door to tell me that I left my garage door gaping wide open
and the neighborhood hoods are eyeing my bicycles, I usually thank her
rather than knocking her down and calling the police.  Then I go and fix
the garage door.

If the stranger had taken a few bicycles before coming and telling me about
the problem, that would be different.  But even that is preferable to their
stealing the bicycles and not even telling me I had a problem.

Sites all over the Internet *are* being probed by people who want to do
them harm.  We know this as a fact.  I would prefer if we had some
volunteer "cop on the beat"s who would walk by periodically and rattle the
door to make sure it's locked.

   John

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From: snowgoose!@UUNET.UU.NET
Date: Mon, 17 Dec 90 16:16:00 -0500
Subject: Is Technology Beyond the Law?

                         Is Technology Beyond the Law?

There are many factors which shape events like Operation Sun Devil.
Certainly mission, political mandate, public perception, and human frailty
are forces which shaped the behavior of the Secret Service.  But, the
juxtaposition of technology and the law may well be the most significant
factor.

Law is (or at least, is supposed to be) a reflection of the needs of
society for definition of and protection of its interests.  Technology
presents rapidly changing circumstances with which the law, because the
people, cannot keep abreast.  Technology is, and will always be, beyond the
law?

Now, I'm not a lawyer, and I haven't got a clue of how to conceptualize
this under the law, but consider the following:

One day, the Secret Service shows up at my door with a search warrant to
seize and search my computer for incriminating evidence.  They get my
computer back to their lab and discover that the entire hard disk is
encrypted, (probably block by block).  Upon further examination, they find
either an encryption card or a software encryption routine in the disk
driver.  I'm not going to give them the key.  I have used a sufficiently
difficult encryption technique as to frustrate even the NSA.  Where does
that leave their investigation?  Where does that leave my computer?

Is there a concept in the law which requires that a law must be
enforceable?  If so, isn't investigation an enforcement procedure?  If so,
and if the law isn't enforceable, what happens to my computer with its
encrypted disk?

I have intentionally exaggerated the technical circumstances to raise the
question, but it seems to me that the same situation exists today.  The
Secret Service has had 40+ computers and 23,000?  disks since their seizure
on May 8th, 1990.  If we assume that the Secret Service has procedures
(methods and techniques) for using the seized property in their
investigation, then is there a time limit on how long the investigation
can continue?  If it could be demonstrated that there were *no* procedures
for using the seized property in furtherance of the investigation, would
they have a right to have seized it?

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